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Plato on Medicine's Role in Society: 
The Care of the Elderly 
Robert Barnet 
A Reno, Nevada physician and member of the National Federation of 
Catholic Physicians' Guilds, Dr. Barnet has previously contributed 
articles to Linacre Quarterly. 
Plato was the teacher of Aristotle, as well as an important source for the 
early Christian thinkers including Augustine. Thomas Aquinas continued 
to draw on the wisdom of Plato as well as Aristotle. Perhaps by trying to 
understand how Plato might have dealt with a modern moral problem, we 
might gain that perspective which often comes with standing back and 
looking through the eyes of someone less closely involved. O'Rourke and 
Brodeur identify as a "serious problem in medical ethics" that "health care 
professionals often must decide when to allow a person to die."· Let us try 
to examine this question through the gaze of Plato. 2 
On Monday, Oct. 6,1986, there was an article on the editorial page of 
the New York Times by Alvin Feinstein, Professor of Medicine at the Yale 
University School of Medicine, about a 96-year old woman. She was 
treated for pneumonia following a stroke and survived. Feinstein describes 
her, at that time, as in "the agony of her vegetation". He identifies the 
decision to treat her vigorously, which was made by the doctors, as one 
which would "benefit no one except their own satisfaction in thwarting 
death, regardless of the consequences". As Feinstein ends, he asks, 
"Why?", and weeps both for the woman, his mother, and the profession, 
also his own. 
Plato, and Feinstein, I suspect, would have made one identical decision. 
Neither would have treated her pneumonia. I also suspect Feinstein would 
have performed one further act, however. He would have held her hand-
not as physician, but as loving son. The reasons that neither Feinstein nor 
Plato would not have treated her would also probably - at least in part 
-be different. Feinstein, in his article, seems to base his agony about the 
treatment on compassion as well as autonomy and a recognition ofIimits . 
He writes of his mother's values and her clearly expressed wishes. She had 
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led a full life, was ready to die, and acknowledged that "her time had 
come". In her earlier 90s, she had found joy in life. She later recognized she 
was becoming a burden and did not want to be one. Yet she did not ask for 
the hemlock, but only that death not be thwarted. 
Although both Plato, and apparently Feinstein's mother, saw meaning 
to life after death, that does not seem to have been a factor in her decision. 
Nor was it for Plato in the Republic. when he dealt with similar issues. 
What is different for Plato is that he approached the issue in the setting of a 
discussion of the community and justice. Mrs. Feinstein was concerned 
about being a burden. That was her concern, and not one reflecting her 
family's concern or society'S. The medical decision appears to have been 
one made without a consideration of whether it would involve a burden for 
her, for her family, or for society. The treatment decision presumably was 
made because a potentially treatable illness developed. She was in a health 
care setting and the system reacted as its structure and goals dictated. 
Plato Dealt with Expended Effort 
In Book III of the Republic. Plato deals with the question of how much 
effort should be expended in the care ofthe ill. He tells of Herodicus* (406 
BC) who "became sickly" and "drew out his death .. . attending the mortal 
disease he was unable to cure ... and spent his whole life treating it with no 
leisure for anything else .. . " then " .. . finding it hard to die, thanks to his 
wisdom, he came to an old age."3 Herodicus was a wise man who was able 
do cure himself, and presumably did not take anything from other citizens 
or from the city. Socrates seems to first belittle and then reject the work of 
Herodicus, rather than admire his accomplishments . He states: "He first 
and foremost worried himself to death" (even though he lived to be an old 
age!) "then many others afterwards". Calling Herodicus "wise" was surely 
ironic on Socrates's part. 
Socrates commends Asclepius (406 C) for not recommending 
Herodicus's regimen, not "from ignorance or inexperience", but "rather 
because he knew that for all men obedient to good laws a certain job has 
been assigned to each in the city at which he is compelled to work, and no 
one has the leisure to be sick throughout life and treat himself." Making 
clear the distinction between craftsmen and the rulers, he adds: "It's 
laughable that we recognize this for the craftsmen, while for the rich and 
reputed happy we don't". Plato recognizes that the role of a profession is 
more than to simply exercise the skills of its craft, but that it has an 
obligation to bring about good in society. The healing profession has a 
mandate which is properly directed at healing although it may not include 
the medicalization of dying. 
*Herodicus of Selymbria, probably the teacher of Hippocrates, and an advocate of 
therapeutic gymnastics. 
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Socrates continues (406 DE) with his discussion of the role of the 
craftsman, the ordinary man. Since the carpenter is a different man than 
Herodicus and has an obvious function in the city, "if someone prescribes a 
lengthy regimen for him ... he soon says that he has no leisure to be sick 
nor is a life thus spent ... of any profit." " ... He says goodbye to such a 
doctor .... If his body is inadequate to bearing up under it he dies and is 
rid of his troubles." The ordinary man must, of necessity, be realistic. He is 
also autonomous. Herodicus, rather than being required to contribute 
can, because of his wealth, perhaps live to a ripe old age. In the city of the 
Republic, the carpenter does have a definite and necessary job, and if his 
illness (or its therapy) prevents him from fulfilling his function, there "is no 
profit to go on living". Medical intervention for Socrates is appropriate 
only if it allows the citizen to continue to function in his specific role. This 
argument centers on the good of the whole community. If such care did not 
deprive others of basic health (i.e., did not disrupt the order) perhaps this 
would be less onerous. 
Socrates Challenged 
Glaucon (407 A) challenges Socrates on his criteria for the use of 
medicine. Socrates counters that the rich man, although he may not have a 
craft to perform, must, however, practice virtue. "Excessive care" is 
burdensome and interdicted for the rich man as well as the craftsman. The 
justification is that it disrupts the order and is not virtuous. Overemphasis 
on the satisfaction of the body's demands can become an end in itself, 
ignoring the soul and man's ultimate goal. There is a danger of 
subordinating all (as Herodicus did) to staying alive when there is nothing 
to live for but life. The role of medicine in Plato's society is to help man to 
avoid extremes. And so Socrates chooses the medicine of Asclepius, not of 
Herodicus (407 D): 
Then won't we say that Asclepius, too, knew this and revealed an art of medicine 
for those whose bodies are by nature and regimen in a healthy condition but have 
some distinct and definite disease in them? His medicine is for these men and this 
condition; with drugs and cutting to drive out the diseases, he prescribed their 
customary regimen so as not to harm the city's affairs. But with bodies diseased 
through and through, he made no attempt by regimen - drawing off a bit at one 
time, pouring in a bit at another - to make a lengthy and bad life for a human 
being and have him produce offspring likely to be such as he; he didn't think he 
should care for the man who's not able to live in his established round, on the 
grounds that he's of no profit to himself or to the city. 
The common good - ofthe city, not just of the citizens - is a guide. For 
the craftsman, the guide has been his function as a craftsman; for the rich 
man, the guide is also his function in society, which involves being 
virtuous. Even for the rich man, there is a limit, as noted in the fate of 
Asclepius who ignored his own limit of simple and good medicine (407E-
408C): 
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"You speak," he said, "of a statesman-like Asclepius." 
"Plainly," I said. "And don't you see that his sons, because he was like that , 
both showed themselves to be good men in the war at Troy and made use of the 
art of medicine in the way I say? Or don't you remember that as well from the 
wound Pandarus inflicted on Menelaus. 
They sucked out the blood and sprinkled gentle drugs on it and that after this 
they didn't prescribe what he must drink or eat any more than with Eurypylus, 
believing the drugs to be sufficient to cure men who before their wounds were 
healthy and orderly in their regimen, even if they should happen to take a drink 
mixed with barley, cheese, and wine right away? And, as for those with a naturally 
sickly and licentious body, they thought that living is of no profit either to 
themselves or others, that the art shouldn't be applied to them, and that they 
mustn't be treated - not even if they were richer than Midas." 
"You speak," he said, "of quite subtle sons of Asclepius." 
"It's appropriate," I said . "and yet it's injust this that the tragic poets as well as 
Pindar don't obey us. Although they claim Asclepius was the son of Apollo, they 
also say he was persuaded by gold to cure a rich man who was as good as dead and 
it's for this that he was struck with a thunderbolt." 
How would Plato deal with the issues raised in the Feinstein essay? 
Presumably he would examine the actions (of the physicians) to see what 
good they were ordered to, and whether they were virtuous. 
Were the actions ordered to the good of the "polis"? Nothing suggests 
that . Perhaps they were preserving the "sanctity of life", claiming that each 
life must be preserved at all costs. Feinstein's following description of his 
mother renders my discussion of "good", either for the patient or the 
community, moot: 
She recovered, left the hospital and now resides in a nursing home. She can still 
recognize her family visitors, say their names, and engage in trivial conversation, 
but her mind is substantially destroyed. She does not know where she is or how 
long she has been there . She cannot read, watch television, walk alone, use a 
telephone or play card games. She retains bladder and bowel continence, but she 
cannot dress herself, feed herself or transfer from bed to chair to bathroom. 
She is no longer aware of her plight, and expresses no suggestion of despair, but 
everything she wanted to avoid has happened. In a semi-vegetating state, she has 
lost her functional and mental independence. 
Was the action for "the good of the profession"? Feinstein's appraisal is 
that it was done "for their own satisfaction". A harsh judgment perhaps. It 
cannot be characterized as moderation. It certainly does not fit Plato's 
criterion for justice. Plato's reaction would have been, without a doubt, to 
call on the gods to send down a thunderbolt. Or so it seems. 
One Not Left to Rest 
Although Plato was left to rest, Feinstein was not. On Oct. 21 , 1986, 
three letters were published in the New York Times. Two were from 
physicians. The first charges him with a "misconceived", "simplistic 
accusation of the medical profession". For the writer argues that "life and 
death" decisions are "rarely easy or clear cut", and seemingly, that when 
benefit (any benefit?) is in doubt, and there is any degree of uncertainty 
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("when the odds against recovery can no longer be beaten"), therapeutic 
action is mandated. 
This position is justified by the "awareness that a life lost cannot be 
restored", and the "insecurity of placing a value on another's existence". 
Feinstein is chided that he should. not "play dice" with his patients' lives. 
This first writer has made Feinstein his mother's physician, not his 
mother's son. Feinstein's plea was first that his mother's person and her 
wishes be respected . Secondly, he was asking that the benefits to her of the 
medical decision be considered and weighed. She or her representative had 
that right; the physicians had a clear duty both to learn her wishes and to 
include them in the decision-making process. Accompanying Feinstein's 
essay was a drawing of an elderly gowned woman in a long dark tunnel 
(Plato's cave?). This drawing, like Feinstein's essay, has a Rorschach 
quality about it. Both are open to variable interpretations which will be 
influenced by the perspective of the reader or the observer. My goal is to 
explore the role of medicine and I therefore attribute to Feinstein the 
concerns of a loving son for his mother and of a physician for his 
profession. 
A third consideration is what role medicine should play in a life of such a 
person as this woman. Is there a time when medicine no longer has a role 
(as Plato suggests in the Republic) and should acknowledge that it no 
longer functions as a "healer"? Should it recognize that there is a time for 
"care-giving" and that "care-giving is different from 'healing' "? It seems 
implicit that Feinstein was asking for such a recognition and the right to be 
a compassionate "hand holding" son, not a professional decision maker. 
Claims of Second Letter 
A second letter, also from a physician, calls Feinstein's 96-year old 
mother "abnormal" because of her wish to die. He further describes her as 
being "under the illusion" of her fierce independence. For his part, this 
physician saw "nothing in the record" which should have "induced the 
doctor to let her die". He argues that even though the quality of life "may 
reach a low point", that it is "nevertheless ... preferable to the alternative." 
The argument continues that she has an "eternal ... interdependence" 
(mortal or immortal?). She is then labeled as having a "psychosocial 
problem". She must, he suggests, acknowledge her dependence and 
recognize that she is a victim, not of society or the health care system, but 
of "an abnormal fiercely independent outlook". With this she has acquired 
a diagnostic label and is coopted by the profession. My own reading is that 
she was ready to die as we must all be at some time. The real denial is the 
denial of man's mortality. Perhaps the real fiction is that medicine and the 
health care system (the medical-industrial complex) should define and 
control all aspects of life from birth to death, from nutrition to sports. 
Criticism of Feinstein is not surprising. Society and the medical 
profession's tendency today is to "roll the dice to win no matter what the 
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odds". This is true whether the gamble is for a ten million dollar lottery or a 
life and suggests that: 
When you are exhausted from trying to beat the odds against recovery, when 
you want only to cash in your chips and let them fall where they may, you do not 
ask your doctor to gamble with your life but to stop gambling. The physician who 
overrules the request, insisting instead on rolling the medical dice again and again 
in an effort to see how long the inevitable can be postponed, is the one who is 
gambling. 
Some doctors, in the midst of such a crapshoot, will actually try to engage the 
patient in a debate about the value of human life.' 
We had initially looked at Plato's ideas and tried to apply them to the 
issues raised by Feinstein's essay. Plato makes frequent use of medical 
analogies to help us understand such issues as justice and the role of the 
state. These same analogies give us understanding of Plato's ideas .on 
medicine. The role of and limits on the state developed in the analogies can 
help us reflect on the role of and possible limits on medicine in Plato's 
thoughts. 
In our initial comments on Feinstein's essay, considered in the context 
of Plato's philosophy, we had written of justice and moderation as 
appropriate and pertinent themes in The Republic. An admonition for 
moderation and a requirement that medicine's role be one ordered to the 
good of the state were identified . Although it might be allowed for the rich 
to spend their excess wealth for special care, it also might be seen as 
burdensome if it "disrupts the order". The replies to Feinstein's essays have 
suggested that our goal as physician-citizen should not be the good of the 
city, nor even the benefits as individuals see them, but rather the life ofthe 
individual for its own sake (or perhaps the "benefit" as the physician sees 
it). In The Republic, we were told that the proper role of medicine was to 
allow the citizen to continue his work and to fulfill his role in society. How 
else does Plato deal with this aspect? 
Where Discussion Leads 
In The Republic (406-407), Plato's discussion leads to a position that 
medicine (as other professions) has a role in society which should be 
ordered to the needs of society. When that role is no longer fulfilled, the 
physician should cease efforts that are futile . It is, however, quite a 
different argument that when one's efforts are futile and no longer 
contribute to the common good, that the medical role should be expanded. 
That expansion might include the sustenance of a weakened, ill and 
incurable citizen or the "merciful dispatch" of the useless. Both are quite 
different from the role of nourishing, healing or guidance in developing a 
strong and healthy body that prevails in Plato's description of what is 
appropriate. 
Plato does not argue for the right (or duty) of a physician (406 C) to 
determine when to continue to treat, but rather puts that control in the 
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hands of the patient. The citizen (such as Feinstein's mother) finding no 
prompt and sure cure, goes about "minding his own business; ifhis body is 
inadequate to bearing up under it, he dies and is rid of his troubles." 
O'Rourke and Brodeur had initially framed the dilemma as one in which 
"health care professionals" must be the ones to decide. Is that central to 
our problem? Who is to decide? And is not the appropriate medical 
decision one of when to treat rather than when to let die? We may be 
accused of avoiding the issue, but it is clear that we are not obliged to treat 
under all circumstances. The question should be then: under what 
circumstances? What Plato has shown us is that not decisions of life and 
death, not all aspects of life are medical decisions . 
Not only is moderation central to a profession's proper function within 
the state, but in The Laws (631 BC)5 we find the same theme applied in a 
way which makes it appropriate both for the citizen and state . .The 
Athenian stranger ranks goods which are in part human and part divine. 
The human goods are subsidiary and "depend on the divine goods". Ofthe 
divine goods, "prudence is first and leader among the divine goods. Second 
after intelligence comes a moderate disposition of the soul, and from these 
two mixed with courage comes justice, in third place. Courage is fourth. 
All of these last goods are placed prior in rank to the first", (i.e., prior to the 
human goods). "And this is the rank they should be placed by the 
legislator." Of the human goods, "health leads the lesser goods; in the 
second place is beauty; third is strength, both in running and in all motions 
of the body; and fourth is wealth." 
Call for a Moderate Stance 
Elsewhere in The Laws, the call is for a moderate stance: "What is just 
... does not grow apart from moderation" (696 c). In 697 b Plato 
recognizes the "limits of human power" as when "it must necessarily 
apportion honors and dishonors correctly. The correct apportionment is 
one which honors most the good things pertaining to the soul (providing it 
has moderation), and secondly, "the beautiful and good things pertaining 
to the body". To go outside this ranking is "neither pious or 
statesman-like". 
A further nuance on the idea that medicine should recognize its limits is 
found in the Laws in the discussion of the physician and pilot (of a ship) 
being challenged by the unexpected and uncontrollable (709) . During 
epidemics and storms at sea, it is important to recognize the element of 
chance and uncertainty. Plato here invokes art (not science) as a "great 
advantage when it comes to operating with the opportune moment in the 
midst of a gale". One who possesses the art would "presumably be able to 
pray in the correct way for that which, being available to him through 
chance, would make nothing lacking except the art" (709 d). Plato, in the 
natural order, seems to emphasize the limits of man (pilot and physician) 
and call for a recognition that neither change nor divine providence is 
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man's domain. We are not gods. 
Inherent in Plato's dialogues is a recogmtlOn of the physician's 
nurturing role - a role of restoring health. There is recognition that there 
is a point in time at which it is not possible nor reasonable to "nurture". 
When that role can no longer be fulfilled, such a limitation should be 
acknowledged. Plato recognizes our finite capacity which is not the same 
as deciding for death. For Plato, the decision for death is not a 
consideration of the profession. In The Statesman, physicians are called 
on to "nurture" (268) and are to "supervise by art, and, by purging or 
slimming (us) ... increasing (us), if only for the good of the bodies, by 
making them better from worse." Not only are there limits to what a 
physician can do as physician, but there is a time at which it is appropriate 
that the physician should recognize that he is no longer "healer and 
nurturer". In the context of Plato's ideas, that time would appear to be 
when the physician can no longer be effective in sustaining or restoring 
citizens to that "role in society which contributes to the common good". 
What then may be another's duty is a separate question. 
In the care of the aged and the incurable, Plato recognizes an approach 
for the physician based on moderation. This involves a recognition of 
limits and that the profession's role should be to nourish and heal the sick 
and to strengthen the healthy body. 
When young children talk about their imaginary friends and 
nonexistent exploits, we exclaim, "What a wonderful creative mind!" 
When old folks do the same, we classify them as senile and out of touch 
with reality. There is an important point that we should recognize about 
the elderly who are near the end of their life. Their imagination still 
functions. Despite their solitude, they often live a rich interior life - rich in 
memories. They have much to remember and are able to imagine and 
recreate, frequently changing reality into the more pleasant and 
acceptable. 
What is needed is both a re-examination of the role of the profession in 
providing for the care ofthe elderly, as suggested in our reading of Plato, at 
the same time, that we reexamine the role of friends, families and 
individuals in society in the humane care of each individual. The need is to 
de-medicalize and to de-institutionalize - to humanize those final days. 
I do not suggest that the elderly be abandoned. On the contrary, I 
suggest that they be rescued from abandonment. 
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